Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889 in Messkirch in south-west Germany to a Catholic family. His father worked as sexton in the local church. In his early youth Heidegger was being prepared for the priesthood. In 1903 he went to the high school in Konstanz, where the church supported him by a scholarship, and then, in 1906, he moved to Freiburg. His interest in philosophy first arose during his high school studies in Freiburg when, being seventeen, he read Franz Brentano's book entitled On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle. By his own account, it was this work that inspired his life-long quest for the meaning of being. In 1909, after completing the high school, he became a Jesuit novice, but was discharged within a month for reasons of health. He then entered Freiburg University where he studied theology. However, a deteriorating health condition and perhaps a lack of a strong spiritual vocation led Heidegger in 1911 to leave the seminary and beak off his training for the priesthood. He took up studies in philosophy, mathematics, and natural sciences. It was also at that time that he first became influenced by Edmund Husserl. He studied Husserl's Logical Investigations. In 1913 he completed a doctorate in philosophy with a dissertation on The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism under the direction of the neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 interrupted briefly Heidegger's academic career. He was enlisted in the army, but after two months released because of health reasons. Hoping to take over the chair of Catholic philosophy at Freiburg, Heidegger now began to work on his habilitation thesis on Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Categories and Meaning, the second qualifying dissertation that would win him a license to teach at the university. The dissertation was completed in 1915 and in the same year Heidegger became a Privatdozent or unsalaried lecturer. He taught mostly courses in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, and regarded himself as standing in the service of the Catholic world-view. Nevertheless, his turn from theology to philosophy was soon to be followed by another turn. In 1916 he came to know personally Edmund Husserl who joined the Freiburg faculty. Then, in 1917 he married Thea Elfride Petri, a Protestant student who had attended his courses since the fall of 1915. His career was again interrupted in 1918 when he was called up for active military duty. He served as a weatherman on the western front during the last three months of the war. When he returned to Freiburg, within a few weeks, he announced his break with the "system of Catholicism" (January 9, 1919), got himself appointed as Husserl's assistant (January 21, 1919), and began lecturing in a new, insightful way (February 7, 1919). His lectures on phenomenology and his creative interpretations of Aristotle would earn him now a wide acclaim. And yet, Heidegger was not Husserl's faithful follower. He was not captivated by his master's later developments - by his neo-Kantian turn towards transcendental subjectivity, and even less by his Cartesian turn - but preferred his earlier work, Logical Investigations. Laboring over the question of the things themselves, he soon began to radically reinterpret Husserl's phenomenology.

In 1923 Heidegger moved to Marburg University where with the help of Paul Natrop he obtained a position of associate professor. Between 1923 and 1928 he enjoyed there the most fruitful years of his entire teaching. His students testified to the originality of his insight and the intensivity of his philosophical questioning. Heidegger extended the scope of his lectures, and taught courses on history of philosophy, time, logic, phenomenology, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Leibniz. But since 1916 he had published nothing and the lack of publications stood on the way of his further academic career. Finally, in February 1927, partly because of an administrative pressure, his fundamental, but also unfinished treatise, Being and Time, appeared. Within a few years, this book was recognized as a truly epoch-making work of the 20^th century philosophy. It earned Heidegger, in the fall of 1927, the full professorship at Marburg, and one year later, after Husserl's retirement from teaching, the chair of philosophy at Freiburg University. Although Being and Time is dedicated to Husserl, upon its publication Heidegger's departure from Husserl's phenomenology and the differences between two philosophers became apparent. Next works, published in 1929, "What is Metaphysics?," "On the Essence of Ground," and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, had further revealed how far Heidegger moved from neo-Kantianism and phenomenology of consciousness to his phenomenological ontology.

Heidegger's life entered in a new, controversial stage with Hitler's rise to power. In September 1930, Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) became the second largest party in Germany and on January 30, 1933 Hitler was appointed chancellor of the German Republic. Heidegger, who before was virtually apolitical, in early 1930s become politically involved. On April 21, 1933 he was elected rector of Freiburg University by the faculty, and accepted this politically charged post with the motive, as he later claimed, to resist the political control of the university. On May 3, 1933 he joined the NSDAP party. On May 27, 1933 he delivered his inaugural rector's address on "The Self-Affirmation of the German University," whose ambiguous text is frequently interpreted as an expression of his support of Hitler's regime. There is a little doubt that during his tenure as rector, Heidegger became instrumental to Nazi policies and, willingly or not, helped to transform the university into National-Socialist mold. And yet, one year later, on April 23, 1934 Heidegger resigned the rectorate and took no further part in politics. His inaugural rector's address was found incompatible with the party line and its text was eventually banned by the Nazis. There was no trace there of the biologism which sustained nazism, nor of anti-Semitism. Because he was no longer involved in the party's activity, Heidegger's membership in the NSDAP became a mere formality. Various restrictions were put on his freedom to publish and attend conferences. In his lectures of the late 1930s and the early 1940s, especially those which he gave during the period in which he was writing Contributions to Philosophy, he expressed covert criticism of Nazi ideology. For some time he was under surveillance of Gestapo. He was finally humiliated in 1944 when he was declared the most "expendable" member of the faculty and sent to the Rhine to dig trenches. Because of the ambiguity of Heidegger's attitude toward nazism, the period of his life under Hitler's regime and the relationship between his philosophy and political involvement are still the subject of controversy and provoke a heated debate. Following Germany's defeat in the Second World War, Heidegger was in 1945 forbidden to teach and in 1946 dismissed from his chair of philosophy because of alleged Nazi sympathies. The ban was lifted in 1949.

The 1930s are not only marked by Heidegger's controversial involvement in politics, but also by a change in his thinking which is known as "the turn" (die Kehre). In his lectures and writings that followed "the turn," he became less systematic and often more obscure than in his fundamental work, Being and Time. He turned to the exegesis of philosophical and literary texts, especially of the Presocratics, but also of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, and makes this his way of philosophizing. A recurring theme of that time was "the essence of truth." During the decade between 1931 and 1940, Heidegger offered five courses under this title. His preoccupation with the question of language and his fascination with poetry were expressed in lectures on Hörderlin which he gave between 1934 and 1936. Towards the end of 1930s and the beginning of 1940s, he taught five courses on Nietzsche, in which he submitted to criticism the tradition of western metaphysics, described by him as nihilistic, and made allusions to the absurdity of war and the bestiality of his contemporaries. Finally, his reflection upon western philosophical tradition and an endeavor to open a space for philosophizing outside it, brought him to Presocratic thought. In the course of lectures entitled "An Introduction to Metaphysics," offered in the summer semester of 1935, and published in 1953, which can be seen as a bridge between earlier and later Heidegger, the Presocratics were no longer a subject of mere passing remarks as in Heidegger's earlier works. The course was not about early Greek though; and yet, the Presocratics became there the pivotal center of discussion. It is clear that with the evolution of Heidegger's thinking in the 1930s, they gained in importance in his work. During the 1940s, in addition to giving courses on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger lectured extensively on Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus.

During the last three decades of his life, from the mid 1940s to the mid 1970s, Heidegger wrote and published much, but in comparison to earlier decades, there was no significant change in his philosophy. In his insightful essays and lectures, such as "What are Poets for?" (1946), "Letter on Humanism" (1947), "The Question Concerning Technology" (1953), "The Way to Language" (1959), "Time and Being" (1962), and "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (1964), he addressed different issues concerning modernity, labored on his original philosophy of history - the history of being, and attempted to clarify his way of thinking after the turn. Most of his time was divided between his home in Freiburg, his second study in Messkirch, and his mountain hut in the Black Forest. But he escaped provincialism, by being frequently visited by his friends, including, among the others, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, the physicist Werner Heisenberg, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann, the psychologist Ludwig Binswanger, and by traveling more widely than ever before. He lectured on "What is Philosophy?" at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1955, and on "Hegel and the Greeks" at Aix-en-Provence in 1957. He visited Greece in 1962, and again in 1967. In 1966, Heidegger attempted to justify his political involvement during the Nazi regime in an interview with Der Spiegel entitled "Only a God Can Save Us." It was published only ten years later, after his death. One of his last teaching assignments was his seminar on Parmenides which he offered in Zähringen in 1973. Heiddegger died on May 26, 1976 and was buried in the churchyard at Messkirch. To the very end he worked on various projects, including the extensive Gesamtausgabe, the complete edition of his works.

By "phenomenology" Husserl himself had always meant the science of consciousness and its objects; this core of sense pervades the development of this concept as eidetic, transcendental or constructive throughout his works. Following the Cartesian tradition, he saw the ground and the absolute starting point of philosophy in the subject. The procedure of bracketing is essential to Husserl's "phenomenological reduction" - the methodological procedure by which we are led from "the natural attitude," in which we are involved in the actual world and its affairs, to "the phenomenological attitude," in which the analysis and detached description of the content of consciousness is possible. The phenomenological reduction helps us to free ourselves from prejudices and secure the purity of our detachment as observers, so that we can encounter "things as they are in themselves" independently of any presuppositions. The goal of phenomenology for Husserl is then a descriptive, detached analysis of consciousness in which objects, as its correlates, are constituted.

What right does Husserl have to insist that the original mode of encounter with beings, in which they appear to us as they are as things in themselves, is the encounter of consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction and its objects? "Whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as the "things themselves" in accordance with the principle of phenomenology?" These are pressing questions which Heidegger either might have or had asked. Perhaps because of his reverence for Husserl, he does not subject him to a direct criticism in his fundamental work. Nevertheless, Being and Time is itself a powerful critique of the Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger there gives attention to many different modes in which we exist and encounter things. He analyses the structures constitutive of things not only as they are encountered in the detached, theoretical attitude of consciousness, but also in daily life as "utensils" (Zuhandene) or in special moods, especially in anxiety (Angst). Also, he exhibits there the structures that are constitutive of the particular kind of being which is the human being and which he calls "Dasein." For Heidegger, it is not pure consciousness in which beings are originally constituted. The starting point of philosophy for him is not consciousness, but Dasein in its being.

The central problem for Husserl is the problem of constitution: How is the world as phenomenon constituted in our consciousness? Heidegger brings the Husserlian problem one step further. Instead of asking how something must be given in consciousness in order to be constituted, he asks: "What is the mode of being of that being in which the world constitutes itself?" In a letter to Husserl dated October 27, 1927, he states that the question of Dasein's being cannot be evaded, as far as the problem of constitution is concerned. Dasein is that being in which any being is constituted. Further, the question of Dasein's being directs him to the problem of being in general. The "universal problem of being," he says in the same letter, "refers to that which constitutes and to that which is constituted." Hence far from being dependent upon Husserl, Heidegger finds in his thought an inspiration leading him to the theme which continues to draw his attention from his early years: the question of the meaning of being.

Phenomenology receives thus in Heidegger a new meaning. He conceives it more broadly, and more etymologically, than Husserl as "letting what shows itself to be seen from itself, just as it shows from itself." Husserl applies the term "phenomenology" to a whole philosophy. Heidegger takes it rather to designate a method. Since in Being and Time philosophy is described as "ontology" and has as its theme being, it cannot adopt its method from any of the actual sciences. For Heidegger the method of ontology is phenomenology. "Phenonenology," he says, "is the way of access to what is to become the theme of ontology." Being is to be grasped by means of the phenomenological method. However, being is always the being of a being, and accordingly, it becomes accessible only indirectly through some existing entity. Therefore, "phenomenological reduction" is necessary. One must direct oneself toward an entity, but in such a way that its being is thereby brought out. It is Dasein which Heidegger chooses as the particular entity to access being. Hence, as the basic component of his phenomenology Heidegger adopts the Husserlian phenomenological reduction, but gives it a completely different meaning.

To sum up, Heidegger does not base his philosophy on consciousness as Husserl did. For him the phenomenological or theoretical attitude of consciousness, which Husserl makes the core of his doctrine, is only one possible mode of that which is more fundamental, namely, Dasein's being. Although he agrees with Husserl that the transcendental constitution of the world cannot be unveiled by naturalistic or physical explanations, in his view it is not a descriptive analysis of consciousness that leads to this end, but the analysis of Dasein. Phenomenology for him is not a descriptive, detached analysis of consciousness. It is a method of access to being. For the Heidegger of Being and Time philosophy is phenomenological ontology which takes its departure from the analysis of Dasein.

Heidegger's fundamental analysis of Dasein from Being and Time points to temporality as the primordial meaning of Dasein's being. Dasein is essentially temporal. Its temporal character is derived from the tripartite ontological structure: existence, thrownness, and fallenness by which Dasein's being is described. Existence means that Dasein is potentiality-for-being (Seinkönnen); it projects its being upon various possibilities. Existence represents thus the phenomenon of the future. Then, as thrownness, Dasein always finds itself already-in a certain spiritual and material, historically conditioned environment; in short, in the world, in which the space of possibilities is always somehow limited. This represents the phenomenon of the past as having-been. Finally, as fallenness, Dasein exists in the midst of beings which are both Dasein and not Dasein. The encounter with those beings, 'being-alongside' or 'being-with' them, is made possible for Dasein by the presence of those beings within-the-world. This represents the primordial phenomenon of the present. Accordingly, Dasein is not temporal for the mere reason that it exists "in time," but because its very being is rooted in temporality: the original unity of the future, the past and the present. Temporality cannot be identified with ordinary clock time - with simply being at one point in time, at one 'Now' after another - which for Heidegger is a derivative phenomenon. Dasein's temporality does not have also a merely quantitative, homogeneous character of the concept of time found in natural science. It is the phenomenon of original time, of the time which "temporalizes" itself in the course of Dasein's existence. It is a movement through a world as a space of possibilities. The 'going back' to the possibilities that have been (the past) in the moment of thrownness, and their projection in the resolute movement 'coming towards' (the future) in the moment of existence, which both take place in 'being with' others (the present) in the moment of falleness, provide for the original unity of the future, the past, and the present which constitutes authentic temporality.

As authentically temporal, Dasein as potentiality-for-being comes towards itself in its possibilities of being by going back to what has been; it always comes towards itself from out of a possibility of itself. Hence, it comports itself towards the future by always coming back to its past; the past which is not merely past but still around as having-been. But in this "going back" to what it has been which is constitutive together with "coming towards" and "being with" for the unity of Dasein's temporality, Dasein hands down to itself its own historical "heritage," namely, the possibilities of being that have come down to it. As authentically temporal Dasein is thus authentically historical. The repetition of the possibilities of existence, of that which has been, is for Heidegger constitutive for the phenomenon of original history which is rooted in temporality.

The turn is a change in Heidegger's thinking. The consequence of "the turn" is not the abandoning of the leading question of Being and Time. In spite of the change, Heidegger stresses the continuity of his thought. But as "everything is reversed", even the question concerning the meaning of being is reformulated in Heidegger's later works as the question of the openness, i.e. of the truth, of being. Furthermore, since the openness of being refers to a situation within history, the most important conception of later Heidegger becomes the history of being.

For a reader unacquainted with Heidegger's thought both the "question of the meaning of being" and the expression "history of being" sound strange. Firstly, he may argue that when something is said to be, there is nothing expressed which the world "being" could properly denote. Therefore, the word "being" is a meaningless term and the Heideggerian quest for the meaning of being is in general a misunderstanding. Second, the reader may also think that the being of Heidegger should no more likely have history than the being of Aristotle; so that the "history of being" is a misunderstanding as well. Nevertheless, Heidegger's task is precisely to show that there is a meaningful concept of being. "We understand the 'is' we use in speaking," he claims, "although we do not comprehend it conceptually". Can then being be thought of? - Heidegger inquires. Beings - that is something: a table, my desk, the pencil with which I am writing, the school building, a heavy storm in the mountains ..., but being? If being after the meaning of which Heidegger looks seems so elusive, almost like nothing, it is because it is not an entity; it is not what-is; it is no-thing; it is not a being. "Being is essentially different from a being, from beings". The "ontological difference," the distinction between being (das Sein) and beings (das Seiende), is fundamental for Heidegger. The forgetfulness of being which, according to him, occurs in the course of western philosophy amounts to the oblivion of this distinction.

The conception of the history of being is of central importance in Heidegger's thought. Already in Being and Time its idea is foreshadowed as "the destruction of the history of ontology." In Heidegger's later writings the story is considerably recast and called the 'history of being' (Seinsgeschichte). The beginning of this story, as told by Heidegger especially in the Nietzsche lectures, is the end, the completion of philosophy by its dissolution into particular sciences and nihilism - questionlessness of being, a dead end into which the west has run. Heidegger argues that the question of being would still provide a stimulus to researches of Plato and Aristotle, but it was precisely with them that the original experience of being of the early Greeks was covered over. The fateful event was followed by the gradual slipping away of the distinction between being and beings. Called variously by different philosophers, being was reduced to a being: to idea in Plato, substantia and actualitas in Medieval philosophy, objectivity in modern philosophy, and will to power in Nietzsche and contemporary thought. The task which the later Heidegger sets before himself is then to make a way back into the primordial beginning, so that the "dead end" can be replaced by a new beginning. And since the primordial beginning of western thought lies in ancient Greece, those are the Presocratics, the first western thinkers, to whom Heidegger ultimately turns for help into solving the problems of contemporary philosophy and reversing the course of modern history.

"In distinction from mastering beings, the thinking of thinkers is the thinking of being." Heidegger argues that early Greek thinking is not yet metaphysics. Presocratic thinkers ask the question concerning the being of beings, but in such a way that being itself is laid open. They experience the being of beings as the presencing (Anwesen) of what is present (Anwesende). Being as presencing means enduring in unconcealment, disclosing. Throughout his later works Heidegger uses several words in order rightly to convey this Greek experience. What-is, what is present, the unconcealed, is "what appears from out of itself, in appearing shows itself , and in this self-showing manifests." It is the "emerging arising, the unfolding that lingers." The early Greeks do not "objectify" beings (they do not reduce them to an object for the thinking subject), but they let them be as they are, as self-showing rising into unconcealment. They experience the phenomenality of what is present, its radiant self-showing. Further, the departure of western philosophical tradition from what is present in presencing, from the unique experience that astonished the Greeks, has profound theoretical and practical consequences.

Firstly, according to Heidegger, the experience of what is present in presencing signifies the true, unmediated experience of "the things themselves" (die Sache selbst). We may recall that the call to "the things themselves" was included in the Husserlian program of phenomenology. By means of phenomenological description Husserl attempted to arrive at pure phenomena and to describe beings just as they were given independently of any presuppositions. For Heidegger, this attempt has however a serious draw-back. Like the tradition of modern philosophy preceding him, Husserl stood at the ground of subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity or consciousness was for him "the sole absolute being." It was the presupposition that had not been accounted for in his program which aimed to be presuppositionless. Consequently, in Heidegger's view, the Husserlian attempt to arrive at pure, unmediated phenomena fails. Husserl's phenomenology departs from the original phenomenality of beings and represents them in terms of thinking subject as their presupposed ground. By contrast, for the Presocratics, beings are grounded in being as presencing. Being, however, is not a ground. To the early Greeks, being, unlimited in its dis-closure, appears as an abyss, the source of thought and wonder. It calls everything into question, casts the human being out of any habitual ground, and opens before him the mystery of existence.

The departure from what is present in presencing, from the original experience of beings in being which astonished the early Greeks, results in metaphysics. According to Heidegger, today's metaphysics, in the form of technology and calculative thinking related to it, becomes so pervasive that there is no realm of life that is not subjected to its dominance. It imposes on man its technological-scientific-industrial character and makes it the sole criterion of his sojourn on the earth. Grounded in the Cartesian philosophy of the subject and the Nietzschean idea of the unconditioned will, metaphysics provides an answer to the question of the being of beings for contemporary men and women, but skillfully removes from their field of view the problem of existence. Moreover, because of its powerful sway over contemporary human beings, metaphysics cannot be simply cast aside or rejected. Any straightforward attempt to do so can only fortify its power over human life. Metaphysics can neither be rejected, canceled or denied, but it can be overcome by the way of demonstration that it is nihilism. In Heidegger's usage the term "nihilism" has a very specific meaning. What remains unquestioned and forgotten in metaphysics is being; and hence, it is nihilistic.

According to Heidegger, western humankind in all its relations with beings is in every aspect sustained by metaphysics. Every age, every human epoch, however different they are - Greece after Plato, Rome, the middle ages, modernity, the age of technology - is established in some metaphysics and is placed thereby in a definite relationship to what-is as a whole. But metaphysics is a nihilism proper and the metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. Insofar as metaphysics thinks the being of beings, it reduces being to a being; it does not think being as being. Heidegger attempts to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in the history of being which is the history of being's oblivion. His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not a common-sense based positing of some different values or an alternative world-view, but is related to his conception of history, whose central theme is the repetition of the possibilities for existence. It consists in thinking back being to the primordial beginning of the west - the early Greek experience of what is present in presencing - and in repeating this beginning, so that the western world can begin anew.

The aim which later Heidegger sets before himself is precisely to return to the original experience of beings in being that stands at the beginning of Western thought. This unmediated experience of beings in their phenomenality can be variously described: what is present in presencing, the unconcealment of what is present, the original disclosure of beings. To repeat the primordial beginning more originally in its originality means to bring us back to the Presocratic experiences, to dis-close them, and to let them be as they originally are. But the repetition is not for the sake of the Presocratics themselves. Heidegger's work is not a mere antiquarian, scholarly study of early Greek thinking nor an affirmation of the long lost Greek way of life. It occurs within the perspective of nihilism and being's forgetfulness, both unknown to the Greeks, and has as a goal the future possibilities for existence. It happens as the listening that opens itself out to the words of the Presocratics from our contemporary age, from the age of the world picture and representation, the world which is marked by the domination of technology and the oblivion of being. In the first beginning, the task of the Greeks was to ask the question "What are beings?," and hence to bring beings as such as a whole to the first recognition and the most simple interpretation. In the end, the task is to make questionable what at the end of a long tradition of philosophy-metaphysics has been forgotten. The new beginning begins thus with the question of being.

From Being and Time (1927) where the question of the meaning of being is first developed, but still expressed in the language of metaphysics, to "Time and Being" (1962) where an attempt to think being without regard to metaphysics is made, Heidegger goes full circle. Heidegger begins by asking about the multiple meanings of being and ends up conceding its multiplicity and acknowledging that there are multiple determinations or meanings of being in which being discloses itself in history. Nevertheless, in neither of these meanings does being give itself fully. "As it discloses itself in beings, being withdraws." There is an essential withdrawal of being. Therefore, the truth of being is none of its particular historical determinations - idea, substantia, actualitas, objectivity or the will to power. The truth of being can be defined as the openness, the free region which always out of sight provides the space of play for the different determinations of being and human epochs established in them. It is that which is before actual things and grants them a possibility of manifestation as what is present, ens creatum, and objects.

The truth of being, its openness, is for Heidegger not something which we can merely consider or think of. It is not our own production. It is where we always come to stand. We find ourselves thrown in a historically conditioned environment, in an epoch in which the decision concerning the prevailing interpretation of the being of being is already made for us. Yet, by asking the question of being, we can at least attempt to free ourselves from our historical conditioning. The Heidegger's program expressed in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (1964) consists solely in the character of thinking which does not attempt to dominate, but engages in disclosing and opening up what shows itself, emerges, and is manifest. When Heidegger urges us to stand in being, he does not merely ask us to acknowledge our own place in being's history, but to be future-oriented and see the future in a unity with the past as having-been and the present. It means turning oneself into being in its disclosing withdrawal.

Heidegger claims that human being as Da-sein can be understood as the site, "Da" which being requires in order to disclose itself. The human being is the unique being whose being has the character of openness toward being. But men and women can also turn away from being, forget their true selves, and thus deprive themselves of their humanity. This is, in Heidegger's view, the situation of contemporary humans who have replaced authentic questioning concerning their existence by ready-made answers served by ideologies, mass media, and overwhelming technology. Consequently, Heidegger attempts to bring contemporary men and women back to the question of being. At the beginning of the tradition of western philosophy the human being was defined as animal rationale, the animal endowed with reason. Since then reason has become an absolute value which through education brings a gradual transformation of all spheres of human life. It is not more reason, especially in its calculative form, Heidegger believes, that we today need, but more openness toward and more reflection upon that which is our nearest - being.

I. Published Writings, 1910-1976

1. Frühe Schriften (1912-16).

2. Sein und Zeit (1927). Translated as Being and Time by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

3. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929). Translated as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).

4. Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1936-68). Translated as Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry, by Keith Hoeller (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2000).

5. Holzwege (1935-46).

6. Vol. I, Nietzsche I (1936-39). Translated as Nietzsche I: The Will to Power as Art by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); Vol. II, Nietzsche II (1939-46). Translated as "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same" by David F. Krell in Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same (New York, Harper & Row, 1984).

7. Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936-53).

8. Was heisst Denken? (1951-52). Translated as What Is Called Thinking? by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

9. Wegmarken (1919-58). Translated as Pathmarks. Edited by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

10. Der Satz vom Grund (1955-56). Translated as The Principle of Reason by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

11. Identität und Differenz (1955-57). Translated as Identity and Difference by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

12. Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Translated as On the Way to Language by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

13. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910-76).

14. Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-64). Translated as On Time and Being by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Contains: "Time and Being," "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," and "My Way to Phenomenology."

15. Seminare (1951-73).

16. Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910-1976).

II. Lectures from Marburg and Freiburg, 1919-1944

17. Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie (winter semester, 1923-1924).

18. Aristoteles: Rhetorik (summer semester, 1924).

19. Platon: Sophistes (winter semester, 1924-1925). Translated as Plato's Sophist by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997).

20. Prolegomena zur Geschite des Zeitbegriffs (summer semester, 1925). Translated as History of the Concept of Time by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

21. Logik: Die frage nach der Wahrheit (winter semester 1925-1926).

22. Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (summer semester 1926).

23. Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant (winter semester 1926-1927).

24. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (summer semester 1927). Translated as The Basic Problems of Phenomonology by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

25. Phänomenologie Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (winter semester 1927-1928). Translated as Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
26. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (summer semester, 1928). Translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).

27. Einleitung in die Philosophie (winter semester 1928-1929).

28. Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (summer semester, 1929).

29/30. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit (winter semester, 1929-1930). Translated as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

31. Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie (summer semester, 1930).

32. Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (winter semester, 1930-1931). Translated as Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

33. Aristoteles: Metaphysik IX (summer semester, 1931). Translated as Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3 On the Essence and Actuality of Force by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

34. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet (winter semester, 1931-1932).

35. Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) (summer semester, 1932).

36/37. Sein und Wahrheit (winter semester, 1933-1934).

38. Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (summer semester, 1934).

39. Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (winter semester, 1934-1935).

40. Einführung in die Metaphysik (summer semester, 1935). Translated as An Introduction to Metaphysics by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

41. Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen. (winter semester, 1935-1936). Translated as What Is a Thing by W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967).

42. Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) (summer semester, 1936). Translated as Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom by Joan Stambaugh, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1984).

43. Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (winter semester, 1936-1937). Translated as Nietzsche I: The Will to Power as Art by David F. Krell (New York, Harper & Row, 1979).

44. Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen (summer semester, 1937). Translated as "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same" in Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).

45. Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik" (winter semester, 1937-1938). Translated as Basic Questions of Philosophy by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

46. Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung (winter semester, 1938-1939).

47. Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis (summer semester, 1939). Translated as "The Will to Power as Knowledge" in Nietzsche III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics by Joan Stambaugh (New York, Harper & Row, 1987).

48. Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus (second trimester, 1940).

49. Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische untersuchungen ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhaengenden Gegenstaende (1809) (first trimester, 1941).

50. Nietzsches Metaphysik (1941-2). Einleitung in die Philosopie - Denken und Dichten (1944-5).

51. Grundbegriffe (summer semester, 1941). Translated as Basic Concepts by Gary Aylesworth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

52. Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken" (winter semester, 1941-1942).

53. Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister" (summer semester, 1942). Translated as Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister" by William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

54. Parmenides (winter semester, 1942-1943). Translated as Parmenides by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992).

55. Heraklit. 1. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit). (summer semester, 1943); 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos (summer semester, 1944).

56/57. Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (1919).

58. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (winter semester, 1919-1920).

59. Phaenomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung (summer semester, 1920).

60. Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (summer semester, 1921).

61. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomeno-logische Forschung (winter semester, 1921-1922).

62. Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik. (summer semester, 1922).

63. Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität (summer semester, 1923). Translated as Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity by John va Buren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

III. Private Monographs and Lectures, 1919-1967

64. Der Begriff der Zeit (1924). Translated as The Concept of Time by William McNeill, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

65. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938). Translated as Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning) by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

66. Besinnung.

67.Metaphysik und Nihilismus. Die Überwindung derMetaphysik. Das Wesen des Nihilismus.

68. Hegel. Die Negativität. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel aus dem Ansatz in der Negativität (1938-1939, 1941). 2 Erläuterung der "Einleitung" zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (1942).

69. Die Geschichte des Seyns (1938-1940).

71. Das Ereignis (1941)

73. Wahrheitsfrage als Vorfrage. Die Aletheia: Die Erinnerung in den ersten Anfang; Entmachtung der Ousis (1937).

75. Zu Hölderlin - Griechenlandreisen.

77. Feldweg-Gespräche. (1944-1945)

79. Bremer und Freiburger Vortraege.

80. Vorträge Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Freiburg lecture (1930). Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes (1935).

81. Gedachtes.

82. Anmerkungen zu "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1936). Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit" (1936). Laufende Anmerkungen zu Sein und Zeit (1936).

83. Marburger Übungen. Auslegungen der Aristotelischen "physik".

84. Leibniz-Übungen.

IV. Notes and Fragments

85. Vom Wesen der Sprache

87. Übungen SS 1937. Neitzsches metaphysische Grundstellung. Sein und Schein (1937)

88. Einübung in das Denken. Die metaphysischen Grundstellungen des abendländischen Denkens. Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft.

94. Überlegungen II-VI.

95. Überlegungen VII-XI.

96. Überlegungen XII-XV.